





QUEBEC’S BILL 62: LEGISLATING DIFFERENCE 
Vrinda Narain0F* 
On October 18, 2017, Bill 62, whose full English title is 
“An Act to foster adherence to state religious neutrality and, in 
particular, to provide a framework for religious accommodation 
requests in certain bodies,” came into force in the Canadian 
province of Quebec.  In effect, Bill 62 prohibits niqab-wearing 
women from giving or receiving public services.  It reflects 
anxiety about religious minorities’ illiberal practices and 
discomfort with the accommodation of religious difference—the 
“hypervisibility” of Islamic differences in particular.  Bill 62 
constructs the multiculturalism and reasonable accommodation 
debates in a way that erases race and replaces it with culture 
and religion.  In turn, the politics of reasonable accommodation 
in Quebec conceptualize racialized minorities as threats to 
Canadian and Quebecois national identity and casts them aside 
as illegitimate citizens unless they assimilate.  State multicul-
turalism and the reasonable accommodation discourse reinforce 
the racial status quo by setting the terms of the debate and the 
limits of tolerance—the “epistemic conditions” that dissuade a 
close scrutiny of the state’s management of diversity.  This 
Article offers a close analysis of Bill 62 by following a frame-
work that is built on four pillars: (1) interrogating secularism 
and state neutrality; (2) foregrounding structural difference to 
achieve systemic equality; (3) theorizing reasonable accommo-
dation; and (4) combatting persisting colonial and Orientalist 
tropes of racialized Muslim women. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
On October 18, 2017, the Quebec Legislature enacted 
Bill 62, or “An Act to foster adherence to state religious 
neutrality and, in particular, to provide a framework for 
religious accommodation requests in certain bodies,” with 
sixty-six votes in favor and fifty-one votes against the 
controversial provincial legislation.1  Bill 62, which effectively 
prohibits niqab-wearing women from giving or receiving public 
services, is the result of a history of political debates in the 
province of Quebec starting in the early 2000’s concerning 
reasonable accommodation.  Borrowing from human rights 
legislation in the employment discrimination context, the 
                                               
1 An Act to foster adherence to State religious neutrality and, in 
particular, to provide a framework for requests for accommodations on 
religious grounds in certain bodies, S.Q. 2017, c 19 (Can.).  
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doctrine of reasonable accommodation sets out the legal duty 
of employers to accommodate the religious practices of their 
employees.2  Since 1985, Canadian jurisprudence has quickly 
extended reasonable accommodation beyond the employment 
context to the balancing of religious freedom with other rights, 
notably equality rights.3  These claims invariably converge at 
the intersection of religious freedom, equality, and minority 
rights.4    
In its proportionality analysis under section 1 of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the Supreme Court 
of Canada asserted that the state has the duty to accommodate 
religious difference up to the point of undue hardship.5  The 
Supreme Court of Canada’s decisions regarding religious 
freedom and reasonable accommodation are inevitably 
embedded in the context of public debate about religious 
difference and the limits of toleration.  Reasonable accommo-
dation and its accompanying discourse represent the frame-
work within which the state accommodates both minority 
difference and efforts to establish the extent to which the state 
ought to permit minority cultural and religious practices in 
the public sphere.  Reflecting the public discourse regarding the 
anxiety about religious minorities’ illiberal practices and the 
discomfort with the accommodation of religious difference, 
particularly the “hypervisibility” of Islamic differences,6 suc-
cessive provincial governments have tabled bills regulating 
the presence of religion in public spaces.  These legislative 
efforts punctuate provincial politics and provide a useful prism 
for analyzing legal institutions’ role in responding to popular 
anxieties and shaping the perception of difference.  
                                               
2 Lori G. Beaman, Introduction: Exploring Reasonable Accommodation, 
in REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION 1, 2 (Lori G. Beaman ed., 2012). 
3 Sujit Choudhry, Rights Adjudication in a Plurinational State: The 
Supreme Court of Canada, Freedom of Religion, and the Politics of Reasonable 
Accommodation, 50 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 575, 585–86 (2013). 
4 Id. 
5 See Multani v. Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys, 2006 
SCC 6, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 256 (Can.); see also Lorne Sossin, God at Work: Religion 
in the Workplace and the Limits of Pluralism in Canada, 30 COMP. LAB. L. 
& POL'Y J. 485, 491 (2009). 
6 See Amélie Barras, Exploring the Intricacies and Dissonances of 
Religious Governance: The Case of Quebec and the Discourse of Request, 4 
CRITICAL RES. ON RELIGION 57, 59 (2016).  
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Bill 62 intervenes in the evolution of Canadian multi-
culturalism and reasonable accommodation at a crucial time.  
Hate crimes against Muslims are on the rise, marked most 
notably by the Quebec City Mosque shooting of 2017.7  Con-
temporary public and political discourse focuses on the “crisis 
of multiculturalism”: the notion that multiculturalism has 
failed to foster inclusion and integration of minority groups 
within liberal democracies.8  Some go so far as to announce 
the “death” of multiculturalism.9  Although scholars note that 
Canada has not experienced the same rejection of multicul-
turalism as some European countries such as Denmark or 
Germany, and the majority of Canadians appear to support 
multiculturalism as official policy, support for multicultur-
alism in Canada has been primarily for national minorities.10  
There has not been similar enthusiasm with respect to im-
migrant minorities, particularly in Quebec.11  As distinguished 
sociologist and professor at the University of Montreal Sirma 
Bilge notes:  
 
In recent years, the belief that multi-
culturalism has been a dismal debacle in Europe 
and that Canada will inevitably follow a similar 
path has gained dominance in Canadian media 
discourses. Despite research evidence showing 
stable public support for multiculturalism in 
Canada, several analysts, convinced of the fate 
awaiting Canadian multiculturalism, diligently 
                                               
7 See Amy Minsky, Hate Crimes Against Muslims in Canada Increase 
253% over Four Years, GLOBAL NEWS (June 13, 2017), https://globalnews.ca 
/news/3523535/hate-crimes-canada-muslim/ [https://perma.cc/PCW7-WNG6].  
8 See, e.g., David Miller, The Changing Face of Multiculturalism 
in Europe, GLOBE & MAIL (Apr. 18, 2016), https://www.theglobeandmail 
.com/opinion/the-changing-face-of-multiculturalism-in-europe/article29647990/ 
[https://perma.cc/3F6X-VGJK]; John Paul Tasker, Maxime Bernier Criticizes 
Liberals for 'Extreme Multiculturalism', CBC NEWS (Aug. 13, 2018), https: 
//www.cbc.ca/amp/1.4783325 [https://perma.cc/ZE6C-D34B].  
9 Miller, supra note 8.  
10 See, e.g., Will Kymlicka, The New Debate on Minority Rights, in 
MULTICULTURALISM AND POLITICAL THEORY 25, 25 (Anthony Simon Laden 
& David Owen eds., 2007); Ayelet Shachar, Squaring the Circle of 
Multiculturalism: Religious Freedom and Gender Equality in Canada, 10 
L. & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 31 (2016). 
11 Keith Banting & Will Kymlicka, Canadian Multiculturalism: 
Global Anxieties and Local Debates, 23 BRIT. J. CANADIAN STUD. 43 (2010); 
Shachar, supra note 10, at 34–35. 
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track the signs of this imminent collapse—
signs among which the Québécois reasonable 
accommodation (RA) debate holds a privileged 
place, deemed “the first crack in the wall, the 
first real sign of a European-style retreat from 
multiculturalism, and a harbinger of what is 
likely to happen in the rest of Canada.”12  
 
Within this changing context, the focus of this Article is 
Bill 62’s intervention in these debates, its legal implications, 
and its theoretical underpinnings.  This Article argues that Bill 
62 reflects a populist trend in Quebecois politics.  For Ernesto 
Laclau, populism creates “empty signifiers” that symbolically 
order the realm of politics, so that many divergent groups with 
separate interests can identify with slogans and symbols that 
represent broad and vague values such as “justice” or “equal-
ity.”13  Bill 62 is premised on understandings of multi-
culturalism and reasonable accommodation that erase race and 
replace it with culture and religion.  The politics of reasonable 
accommodation in Quebec arguably target racialized minorities 
with language of culture and religion, which will have the 
greatest impact on Muslim women.14  Analysis of Bill 62 il-
luminates this.   
Racialized minorities, particularly Muslim women, are 
constructed as threats to Canadian and Quebecois national 
identity.  National identity becomes an “empty signifier” with 
which a number of different social groups identify.  Racialized 
minorities are produced as an “Other” against Canadian and 
Quebecois mainstream society, and they are cast aside as 
illegitimate citizens unless they assimilate.15  State multicul-
turalism and the reasonable accommodation discourse reinforce 
                                               
12 Sirma Bilge, Reading the Racial Subtext of the Québécois 
Accommodation Controversy: An Analytics of Racialized Governmentality, 
40 POLITIKON 157, 157 (2013) (footnotes omitted). 
13 Ernesto Laclau, Populism: What’s in a Name?, in POPULISM AND 
THE MIRROR OF DEMOCRACY 32 (Francisco Panizza ed., 2005), reprinted in 
ERNESTO LACLAU: POST-MARXISM, POPULISM AND CRITIQUE 152, 157 (David 
Howarth ed., 2015).  
14 See generally Gada Mahrouse, ‘Reasonable Accommodation’ in 
Québec: The Limits of Participation and Dialogue, 52 RACE & CLASS 85 (2010). 
15 See generally Sherene Razack, The ‘Sharia Law Debate’ in Ontario: 
The Modernity/Premodernity Distinction in Legal Efforts to Protect Women 
from Culture, 15 FEMINIST LEGAL STUD. 3 (2007). 
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the racial status quo by setting the terms of the debate and the 
limits of tolerance—the “epistemic conditions” that dissuade a 
close scrutiny of the state’s management of diversity.16 
 The purpose of this Article is to offer a close analysis 
of Bill 62 that “counter[s] the limitations of liberal solutions 
offered to systemic oppression.”17  This analysis follows a 
framework built on four pillars: (1) interrogating secularism 
and state neutrality; (2) foregrounding structural difference 
to achieve systemic equality; (3) theorizing reasonable ac-
commodation; and (4) combatting persisting colonial and 
Orientalist tropes of racialized Muslim women.  Part II con-
textualizes Bill 62 within the history of legislative efforts and 
jurisprudential interventions from which it emerges, paying 
particular attention to the debates in Quebec.  Part III sets out 
the theoretical framework used to analyze Bill 62.  Finally, 
Part IV provides a close reading of the legislative text and a 
substantive analysis as per the theoretical framework outlined 
in Part III. 
 
II. CONTEXT 
The context of Bill 62 is divided into two parts.  First, 
Bill 62 is placed within its historical and political context by 
tracing the lineage of various legislative initiatives in Quebec 
and Canada, including Bill 94, Bill 60 (the Quebec Charter of 
Values), and the Zero Tolerance for Barbaric Cultural Practices 
Act (“BPA”).18  Next, relevant jurisprudence from the Supreme 
Court of Canada is analyzed to provide the legal context of 
the Bill’s main claims about religious neutrality, religious 
freedom, and reasonable accommodation.  The aim in that 
section is not only to address the Bill’s constitutionality, but 
also to set out the legal context in which the Bill makes its 
intervention. 
                                               
16 Bilge, supra note 12, at 162.  
17 Id.  
18 Bill 94, An Act to establish guidelines governing accommodation 
requests within the Administration and certain institutions, 2010, 1st Session, 
39th Legislature, Québec, 2010 (Can.); Bill 60, Charter affirming the values 
of State secularism and religious neutrality and of equality between women 
and men, and providing a framework for accommodation requests, 2013, 1st 
Session, 40th Legislature, Québec, 2013 (Can.); Zero Tolerance for Barbaric 
Cultural Practices Act, S.C. 2015, c 29 (Can.). 
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A. Historical and Political Context 
As contemporary Canadian society has grappled with 
increasing ethno-cultural diversity, the legal recognition of 
minority rights through an official policy of multiculturalism 
has been controversial.  There is tension between women’s 
equal rights on the one hand and multiculturalism and 
religious freedom on the other; minorities seek to have their 
religious needs accommodated, often in the form of exemptions 
from the application of general rules.19  Legislative initiatives, 
public policy, political rhetoric, and public discussions in-
creasingly tie the multiculturalism crisis to gender equality.20  
These debates are often framed in terms of the limits of 
tolerance and the extent to which majority culture can 
accommodate difference.21  The politics of recognition empha-
size practices such as veiling and polygamy as feminism is pit-
ted against multiculturalism.22  Reasonable accommodation 
discourse tends to portray racialized religious minority com-
munities as backward while constructing majority culture as 
the norm.23  This obscures issues of gendered structural 
inequality. 
Canada’s religious landscape is constantly transforming 
because of a steady increase in the number of individuals 
who identify as members of minority religious groups.24  To 
some scholars, Canada continues to appear as a multicultur-
                                               
19 See Vrinda Narain, Critical Multiculturalism, in FEMINIST 
CONSTITUTIONALISM: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES 377 (Beverley Baines et al. eds., 
2012). 
20 See Mahrouse, supra note 14, at 88. 
21 Lori G. Beaman, “It Was All Slightly Unreal”: What’s Wrong with 
Tolerance and Accommodation in the Adjudication of Religious Freedom?, 
23 CANADIAN J. WOMEN & L. 442, 447–51 (2011). 
22 See Leti Volpp, Feminism Versus Multiculturalism, 101 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1181, 1181 (2001); Iris Marion Young, Structural Injustice and the 
Politics of Difference, in MULTICULTURALISM AND POLITICAL THEORY 60, 87 
(Anthony Simon Laden & David Owen eds., 2007). 
23 Beaman, supra note 21, at 442, 447; see also Vrinda Narain, 
Taking “Culture” out of Multiculturalism, 26 CANADIAN J. WOMEN & L. 116 
(2014). 
24 Lori G. Beaman, Religious Diversity in the Public Sphere: The 
Canadian Case, 8 RELIGIONS 259, 260 (2017). 
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alist haven.25  While other Western nation-states have in-
creasingly embraced far-right parties and policies, the 
current federal Liberal government has firmly asserted its 
support for multiculturalism and detailed policies sympa-
thetic to immigration, including a promise to settle a large 
number of Syrian refugees.26  In contrast, the Conservative 
Party under former prime minister Stephen Harper focused 
on emphasizing “Canadian values,” constructing a narrative 
of the ideal citizen that linked citizenship with integration 
rather than accommodation of minority difference.27  Indeed, 
the Conservative government focused on economic immigra-
tion and introduced reform to reduce the number of refugee 
claimants.28  The government tightened citizenship rules, 
making it harder to obtain citizenship while also making it 
easier to be stripped of citizenship on grounds of state se-
curity or terrorism, which reflects the global impact of 9/11.29  
Significantly, the Conservatives under Stephen Harper opposed 
“symbolic” identity markers such as hijabs, niqabs, and 
kippahs.30  
In September 2018, Maxime Bernier, former 
Conservative Party member of Parliament, announced the 
formation of a new party—the People’s Party of Canada.31  
He criticized Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s stance on 
multiculturalism, asserting that Trudeau’s “extreme multi-
culturalism and cult of diversity . . . will divide us into little 
tribes that have less and less in common, apart from their 
                                               
25 See, e.g., Cas Mudde, Putting Canada in a Comparative Context: 
Still the Multiculturalist Unicorn, 22 NATIONALISM & ETHNIC POL. 351 (2016). 
26 Id. at 352; Kalyani Thurairajah, The Jagged Edges of 
Multiculturalism in Canada and the Suspect Canadian, 12 J. MULTICULTURAL 
DISCOURSES 134, 135 (2017). 
27 Shachar, supra note 10, at 55–57. 
28 Id. at 58. 
29 Id. at 32–34.  
30 Kathryn May & Ian Macleod, Bureaucracy Baffled by Harper's 
Niqab Stance, OTTAWA CITIZEN (Oct. 7, 2015), https://ottawacitizen.com/ 
news/politics/harper-doubles-down-on-possible-niqab-ban-in-public-service 
[http://perma.cc/DVW5-D2KW].  
31 Rachel Aiello, Maxime Bernier Launches People's Party of Canada, 
CTV NEWS (Sept. 14, 2018), https://www.ctvnews.ca/politics/maxime-bernier-
launches-people-s-party-of-canada-1.4094059 [https://perma.cc/3BXG-E4NL].  
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dependence on government in Ottawa.”32  Illustrating the 
construction of immigrants as a threat to democracy and 
stability, he went on to write, “Having people live among us 
who reject basic Western values such as freedom, equality, 
tolerance and openness doesn’t make us strong. People who 
refuse to integrate into our society and want to live apart in 
their ghetto don’t make our society strong.”33  Bernier has 
stated that “the ‘old parties’ are not speaking for Canadians, 
and [has] decried political correctness.”34  He has also said 
that he will reconsider current immigration levels and, sig-
nificantly, that he is committed to “making sure that 
newcomers share Canadian values . . . including respecting 
diversity, the rule of law, and the equality of men and 
women.”35 
Given the centrality of multiculturalism to its national 
identity, Canada provides an interesting lens through which 
issues of inclusion and difference can be viewed.  Canada’s 
federal government officially adopted multiculturalism as 
formal policy in the early 1970’s, and this was institutionalized 
in section 27 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
(“the Charter” or “Charter”)36 and in the Canadian 
Multiculturalism Act of 1988.37  Section 27 of the Charter 
provides that the “Charter shall be interpreted in a manner 
consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the 
multicultural heritage of Canadians.”38  Notably, through 
section 28, the Canadian Charter has embraced gender 
equality together with multiculturalism as an interpretive 
provision of Canadian constitutionalism.  Section 28 states, 
“Notwithstanding anything in this Charter, the rights and 
                                               
32 Martin Patriquin, Fears Multiculturalism Will Doom Canada Are 
Unwarranted, Montreal Gazette (Aug. 15, 2018), https://montrealgazette 
.com/opinion/columnists/martin-patriquin-fears-multiculturalism-will-doom-
canada-are-unwarranted [https://perma.cc/F9BG-9WDZ].  
33 Id. 
34 Aiello, supra note 31.   
35 Id. 
36 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the 
Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11 (U.K.) 
[hereinafter Charter].  
37 Canadian Multiculturalism Act, R.S.C. 1985, c 24.  
38 Charter, supra note 36, § 27. 
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freedoms referred to in it are guaranteed equally to male and 
female persons.”39    
As public policy, Canadian multiculturalism is generally 
understood as a hallmark of Canadian national identity.  
Nonetheless, some perceive Quebec as having spurned English 
Canada’s turn towards multiculturalism by perceiving multi-
culturalism as “a subversion of the recognition of the im-
portance of the French as a founding people.”40  This has led 
some Quebec scholars to instead propound interculturalism, 
a concept that seeks to facilitate integration of ethnic minorities 
while preserving the hegemony of the majority culture.41 
Quebec’s approach to legislation may differ from 
common law provinces because it is the only civil law prov-
ince in Canada.  In the civil law tradition, there is an impetus 
to make law and to draft bills as a response to perceived social 
ills.  France follows a similar approach by drafting laws as a 
response to social or “cultural” problems.  Laws on the veil, for 
example, have been debated since the late 1980’s and were 
finally enacted in 2004 as the Loi sur les signes religieux dans 
les écoles publiques françaises (Law on Religious Symbols in 
French Public Schools).42  France banned the niqab in 2010 
with the Loi du 11 octobre 2010 interdisant la dissimulation 
du visage dans l’espace public (Law of October 11, 2010 
Prohibiting Face Covering in the Public Space).43  The 2010 
law, like Bill 62, is an example of viciously colorblind legisla-
tion; while it does not explicitly name a religious or ethnic 
                                               
39 Id. § 28. 
40 Beaman, supra note 24, at 262. 
41 Id.  For a discussion of interculturalism in Québec, see Daniel 
Weinstock, Interculturalism and Multiculturalism in Canada and Quebec: 
Situating the Debate, in LIBERAL MULTICULTURALISM AND THE FAIR TERMS 
OF INTEGRATION 91 (Peter Balint & Sophie Guérard de Latour eds., 2013). 
42 Loi 2004-228 du 15 mars 2004 encadrant, en application du 
principe de laïcité, le port de signes ou de tenues manifestant une 
appartenance religieuse dans les écoles, collèges et lycées publics [Law 
2004-228 of March 15, 2004, framing the Law on Religious Symbols in French 
Public Schools], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] 
[OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Mar. 7, 2004, p. 5190.  
43 Loi 2010-1192 du 11 octobre 2010 interdisant la dissimulation du 
visage dans l'espace public [Law 2010-1192 of October 11, 2010 Prohibiting 
Face Covering in the Public Space], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE 
FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Oct. 11, 2010, p. 18344.  
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community and does not mention the niqab explicitly, its 
provisions target Muslim women.44 
Bill 62 has galvanized a number of responses.  Consti-
tutional scholar Emmett McFarlane notes that Bill 62 “is 
neither neutral nor constitutional.”45  He asserts that, “It is 
impossible to reconcile this law as anything other than the 
targeting of a minority group, a slightly narrower spin on the 
now perennial Quebec debate over the wearing of (non-
Catholic) religious identifiers.”46  According to then justice 
minister Vallée, however, the law is meant to safeguard 
security and identification and to ensure that people can 
communicate.47  Nonetheless, this has not quelled the belief 
that Bill 62 clearly targets Muslim women.48 
The focus on cultural difference in Canadian multicul-
turalism serves to conceal structural inequalities, including 
racial inequality.49  Recent scholarship, for example, has em-
phasized multiculturalism’s exclusionary discursive effects 
and the limits of reasonable accommodation as a discourse 
and practice of multiculturalism.50  In Quebec, the debate 
over reasonable accommodation, the primary framework by 
which religious diversity is managed in the public sphere, 
has been particularly heated since the Supreme Court of 
Canada’s 2006 decision in Multani v. Commission scolaire 
Marguerite-Bourgeoys.51  Indeed, the rhetoric of reasonable 
                                               
44 Morgan Lowrie, Bill 62: Niqabi Women Fear Quebec's Religious 
Neutrality Law, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 22, 2017), https://www.huffington 
post.ca/2017/10/22/bill-62-niqabi-women-fear-quebecs-religious-neutrality-
law_a_23251719/ [https://perma.cc/5V2T-HEBJ].  
45 Emmett Macfarlane, Quebec Law Banning Face Coverings Is 





48 See, e.g., Lowrie, supra note 44 (“[M]any say it unfairly targets 
Muslim women who wear religious face coverings.”).  
49 It also serves to conceal the country’s settler-colonial history.  See 
Barbara Perry, Disrupting the Mantra of Multiculturalism: Hate Crime in 
Canada, 59 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 1637, 1640 (2015); Thurairajah, supra note 
26, at 137. 
50 See, e.g., Barras, supra note 6; Beaman, supra note 24; Perry, 
supra note 49.  
51 Multani v. Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys, 2006 SCC 
6, paras. 71, 78 (Can.). 
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accommodation and its migration from the courts to the arena 
of public discourse can be traced to Multani and the Bouchard-
Taylor Commission that followed.52  Here, the rhetoric of 
reasonable accommodation often functions as code for “too 
much accommodation.”53   
The Quebec provincial government established the 
Bouchard-Taylor Commission in February 2007.  The 
Commission was headed by two professors, Gerard Bouchard 
and Charles Taylor.  The mandate of the Commission was to 
 
a) take stock of accommodation practices in 
Québec; b) analyze the attendant issues bearing 
in mind the experience of other societies; 
c) conduct an extensive consultation on this 
topic; and d) formulate recommendations to the 
government to ensure that accommodation 
practices conform to Québec’s values as a plu-
ralistic, democratic, egalitarian society.54  
 
Bouchard and Taylor’s report for the Commission 
concluded that the perception of minorities as threatening 
Quebec identity was unfounded.55  Nevertheless, some criti-
cized the report for perpetuating the very racial hierarchies 
and exclusions it sought to overcome.56  Through their process 
of public consultations, Bouchard and Taylor inadvertently 
served to reify and validate anti-immigrant, anti-Muslim 
discourse.57  Contrary to political intentions, the Commission’s 
report did not settle the issue of reasonable accommodation, 
                                               
52 Barras, supra note 6, at 58; Beaman, supra note 24, at 262; see 
also GÉRARD BOUCHARD & CHARLES TAYLOR, BUILDING THE FUTURE: A TIME 
FOR RECONCILIATION (2008) [hereinafter BOUCHARD-TAYLOR COMMISSION 
REPORT].  
53 Beaman, supra note 24, at 263. 
54 BOUCHARD-TAYLOR COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 52, at 17. 
55 Id. at 186 (arguing that French-Canadian Quebecers’ beliefs that 
immigrants are devout believers whose “culture is thus sustained by a wealth 
of symbols” is unfounded and that the “identity-related anxiety” of the former 
has “targeted immigrants”). 
56 Mahrouse, supra note 14, at 88. 
57 Id. at 89.  
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which returned to the public eye with Bill 94 in 201058 and 
Bill 60, also known as the Charter of Values, in 2013.  
The now-defunct Bill 60 proposed an amendment to 
the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, banned 
all “conspicuous” religious symbols for state personnel, and 
required receivers of public services to show their faces.59  It 
was received with controversy and criticism and did not sur-
vive the Parti Québécois’s removal from power with the election 
of the Quebec Liberal Party in 2014.60  Liberal leader Philippe 
Couillard opposed the Charter of Values in 2013, promising 
nonetheless to pass a “less constraining version” of Bill 60.61  
Bill 62 was the Liberal Party’s response to the Parti 
Québécois’s Bill 60.62  By banning the niqab, which covers the 
face of the woman who wears it, rather than all religious 
garments, Bill 62 represents an answer to the Liberal gov-
ernment’s electoral promises of a “less constraining” Charter 
of Values.63  Bill 62 illustrates the persistence of notions of 
state neutrality and secularism and the focus on regulating 
minority women in political rhetoric.  It demonstrates the 
                                               
58 Bill 94, An Act to establish guidelines governing accommodation 
requests within the Administration and certain institutions, 2010, 1st Session, 
39th Legislature, Québec, 2010 (Can.).  Bill 94 was precipitated by the 
controversy in February 2009 concerning a young woman enrolled in a 
French language course who refused to remove her niqab.  Her continued 
refusal, despite attempts to accommodate her, eventually led to her expulsion 
from the course.  Bill 94’s purpose was “to establish guidelines governing 
accommodation requests within the Administration and certain institutions.”  
It would have effectively prevented niqabi women from receiving or delivering 
services from a range of public institutions when communication, iden-
tification, or security was at issue.  This restriction would have covered nearly 
every public institution, including childcare centers, school boards, and public 
health facilities. 
59 Bill 60, Charter affirming the values of State secularism and 
religious neutrality and of equality between women and men, and providing 
a framework for accommodation requests, 2013, 1st Session, 40th Legislature, 
Québec, 2013 (Can.). 
60 Maxime Dagenais, Québec Values Charter, CANADIAN 
ENCYCLOPEDIA (Nov. 16, 2017), https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/ar 
ticle/the-charter-of-quebec-values [https://perma.cc/9JEW-KU3N]. 
61 Patrick Bellerose, Promesses électorales: les 12 travaux de Philippe 
Couillard, HUFFINGTON POST QUE. (Apr. 9, 2014), https://quebec.huffington 
post.ca/2014/04/09/promesses-electorales-philippe-couillard-plq_n_5120400 
.html [https://perma.cc/72HG-K5ZL].  
62  Id. 
63 Dagenais, supra note 60.  
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preoccupation with the limits of tolerance and the accommo-
dation of religious difference.  The question of what ought to 
be considered reasonable accommodation and the reasonable 
constraints that can be imposed on religious women, particu-
larly women of color, are theorized in Part III.  
A number of civil society organizations, such as the 
Canadian Civil Liberties Association (CCLA) and the Women’s 
Legal Education and Action Fund (LEAF) have opposed Bill 
62.  LEAF asserted that  
 
this Bill is divisive, discriminatory, and will 
serve to further entrench inequality along 
gender, race, and ethnic lines. The Bill inten-
tionally excludes niqab-wearing women from 
public employment and denies them access to 
fundamentally important social services such 
as healthcare and childcare. This will exacer-
bate the inequality already experienced by 
Muslim women due to violence, racism, sex-
ism, Islamophobia, and xenophobia.64  
 
CCLA also “firmly opposes Bill 62,” claiming that many of the 
legislation’s provisions “clearly violate guarantees set out in 
both the Québec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms and 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.”65  
Bill 62 is currently facing a constitutional challenge.  
The National Council of Canadian Muslims (NCCM) and the 
CCLA launched a legal attack on section 10 of the Bill, the 
article that prohibits receiving or giving public services with 
one’s face covered.66  The action was brought on behalf of 
Marie-Michelle Lacoste, a convert to Islam, and includes tes-
timony from Fatima Ahmad, a McGill University student.  
Justice Babak heard arguments in mid-November 2017.  No 
judgment has been rendered on the merits, but a temporary 
                                               
64 LEAF Opposes the Québec Government’s “Religious Neutrality” 
Bill, Bill 62, LEAF, http://www.leaf.ca/leaf-opposes-the-quebec-governments-
religious-neutrality-bill-bill-62/ [https://perma.cc/F2AU-YXLL].  
65 Quebec Bill 62 Infringes on Freedom of Religion and Equality, 
CANADIAN CIV. LIBERTIES ASS’N (Oct. 17, 2017), http://ccla.org/quebec-bill-62-
infringes-on-freedom-of-religion/ [https://perma.cc/TFV2-S3R3].  
66 CCLA and NCCM Launch Legal Challenge Against Quebec’s 
Bill 62, CANADIAN CIV. LIBERTIES ASS’N (Nov. 7, 2017), https://ccla.org/ccla-
nccm-launch-legal-challenge-quebecs-bill-62/ [https://perma.cc/H6HD-6Z5H].  
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stay on section 10’s application was granted on December 1, 
2017, pending the enactment of guidelines for Bill 62’s appli-
cation and a method for requesting accommodation.67  These 
guidelines identified six criteria for granting a request for 
accommodation and explained that accommodation will be 
given on a case-by-case basis.68  The suspension of section 10’s 
application was set to end on July 1, 2018, when the guidelines 
were officially enacted as regulation, bringing Bill 62 into 
conformity with Justice Babak Barin’s decision. 
Nonetheless, the NCCM and the CCLA still hold that 
these guidelines are not enough to immunize Bill 62 from a 
Charter violation, claiming that they are “inherently prob-
lematic and do nothing to save a law that is fundamentally 
unconstitutional.”69  Indeed, in a decision rendered on June 28, 
                                               
67 National Council of Canadian Muslims (NCCM) v. Attorney 
General of Quebec, 2017 QCCS 5459, [2017] Q.J. No. 16952 (Can. Que.) 
(judgment on application for stay); Judge Grants Stay of Part of Quebec's 
Controversial Religious Neutrality Law, CBC (Dec. 1, 2017), https://www.cbc 
.ca/news/canada/montreal/judge-grants-stay-of-bill-62-1.4429199 [https://per 
ma.cc/BL5S-J3R3]. 
68 Marilla Steuter-Martin, Bill 62: Quebec Releases Criteria for 
Requesting, Granting Religious Accommodation, CBC (May 9, 2018), https:// 
www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/quebec-bill-62-guidelines-accommodations-
1.4655620 [https://perma.cc/6U7M-6UX9].  The government issued the fol-
lowing guidelines for accommodation under Bill 62: 
1. The request must prove that the difference in 
treatment is impairing his or her rights.  
2. The request must be serious and based on sincere 
belief.  
3. The accommodation must be in line with the principle 
of equality of all people. Therefore, it must not result in the 
discrimination of another group.  
4. The accommodation must be in line with the principle 
of the state's religious neutrality.  
5. The accommodation is reasonable. In other words, it 
does not cause undue hardship on others or affect the quality 
of service or public health of others. This also factors in the 
cost of any accommodation.  
6. The person making the request is co-operating in 
seeking a solution, including making concessions. Failure to 
cooperate may result in the request being denied.   
Id. 
69  Bill 62 (Niqab Ban) Guidelines Cannot Save an Unconstitutional 
Law, CANADIAN CIV. LIBERTIES ASS’N (May 11, 2018), http://ccla.org/bill-62-
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2018, Quebec Superior Court Justice Marc-André Blanchard 
criticized Bill 62 and further extended the suspension of 
section 10.  The court was clear that the process of accommo-
dation provided for under Bill 62, even with the guidelines, 
stood on shaky constitutional ground.  According to Justice 
Blanchard, “[t]he Court can only be highly dubious as to the 
constitutional validity of a legal process that requires a citizen 
to obtain, in advance, a permission from a state representative 
to go about her daily life.”70  
It seems that repeated attempts to use reasonable 
accommodation as a way to maintain the status quo—by 
funding a commission or drafting a bill to that effect—are 
destined to accomplish the opposite and to be followed by 
debate, controversy, and legal challenge.  Reasonable ac-
commodation is a jurisprudential tool rather than a definable 
notion.  Its strength, as well as its weakness, stems from its 
adaptability and its ambiguity.  As we will see in the analysis 
of Bill 62, reasonable accommodation often defies definition, 
resists codification, and unsettles legislative efforts. 
 
B. Legal Context 
Analysis of certain cases provides important insight 
into the broader area of religious freedom, accommodation of 
difference, and minority rights.  This jurisprudence situates 
Bill 62 within the federal understanding of the role of the 
state in mediating religion and religious freedom claims.  It also 
draws the legal horizon of the theoretical framework described 
in Part III by giving concrete examples of the limits of legal 
intervention as well as the legal norms which critical schol-
arship must re-envision in view of the substantive equality of 
all Canadians.  
The Supreme Court of Canada has accommodated 
certain objects that are used in religious practice.  In Syndicat 
                                               
niqab-ban-guidelines-cannot-save-unconstitutional-law/ [https://perma.cc/9YA 
J-5PJF].  
70 National Council of Canadian Muslims (NCCM) v. Attorney 
General of Québec, 2018 QCCS 2766 (Can. Que.) (judgment on application 
for stay); Ingrid Peritz, Superior Court Judge Censures Quebec’s Face-
Cover Law Bill 62, GLOBE & MAIL (June 28, 2018), https://www.theglobeand 
mail.com/canada/article-superior-court-judge-censures-quebecs-face-cover-
law-bill-62/ [https://perma.cc/DP8V-3RLZ]. 
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Northcrest v. Amselem, the Supreme Court of Canada specified 
that the state could not rule on religious dogma and accom-
modated the construction of a succah, a structure used in the 
observation of the Jewish holiday of Sukkot, in contravention 
of a condo association’s bylaws.71  The reasonable accommo-
dation debate was triggered again with Multani.  In Multani, 
the Supreme Court of Canada upheld the right of a Sikh boy 
to carry a kirpan72 to school.  The court once again invoked the 
value of multiculturalism to send a powerful message of 
equality between all religions under the Charter.73 
In Bruker v. Marcovitz, the court considered the use of 
religious freedom to evade secular legal obligations—namely, 
a husband’s refusal to grant his wife the Jewish get (required 
for divorce) despite an agreement to do so.  The Bruker court 
emphasized that Canada’s growing diversity had resulted in 
the judicial recognition of the constitutional value of multi-
culturalism and respect for difference.74  Justice Abella ex-
plained that while claims to exemptions and accommodation 
cannot always be privileged and must be balanced against 
the public interest, deciding what aspects of difference can be 
accommodated must be a contextual, purposive exercise focused 
on providing the benefit of the protection of the Charter on the 
claimant.75  
In Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, 
however, the Supreme Court of Canada signaled a greater 
deference to secular government objectives in limiting religious 
freedom, moving away from the understanding of reasonable 
accommodation as articulated in earlier jurisprudence.76  This 
                                               
71 Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem, 2004 SCC 47, para. 50 (Can.). 
72 Multani v. Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys, 2006 SCC 
6 (Can.).  A kirpan is a Sikh religious symbol; it is a small metal dagger or 
sword and is one of the five articles of faith one is obligated to carry at all 
times in the Sikh tradition. 
73 Id. at paras. 71, 78. 
74 Bruker v. Marcovitz, 2007 SCC 54, para. 70 (Can.). 
75 Id. at para. 2.   
76 Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, 2009 SCC 37, 
paras. 66–71 (Can.).  Hutterian Brethren involved a challenge to an Alberta 
law requiring driver’s licenses to include a photograph of the driver.  Members 
of the Hutterian Brethren view voluntarily having their photo taken as a 
violation of their religious beliefs.  As a result, they argued that they should 
be accommodated by instead having a driver’s license stamped with the 
words “not to be used for identification purposes.”  The Supreme Court of 
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case concerned the infringement of the Hutterian Brethren’s 
right to religious freedom by the new regulation in Alberta 
requiring a universal mandatory photograph requirement for 
all driver’s licenses.  Members of the Hutterian Brethren sin-
cerely believe that their religion prohibits them from having 
their photograph willingly taken and challenged this new 
regulation on the ground of religious freedom.  The majority 
ruled that although their right to religious freedom was 
infringed, it was only minimally impaired.77   In its propor-
tionality analysis, the majority upheld the regulation requiring 
universal mandatory photographs to obtain a driver’s license.78 
The complexity of the issues arising at the intersection 
of gender equality, religious freedom, and minority rights is 
epitomized by R. v. N.S., a case concerning the right of a 
Muslim woman to wear a niqab while testifying.  There, the 
Supreme Court of Canada displayed tensions in understand-
ings of multiculturalism and accommodation of religious 
difference.79  The issue of the niqab raised questions of gender 
equality, religious freedom, secularism, and state neutrality 
and tested the limits of the accommodation of difference as 
evidenced by the court’s three separate opinions.  The majority 
in N.S. rejected the claim advanced by the concurrence that 
to accommodate religion in the courtroom would be to com-
promise the neutrality of public institutions and reiterated 
the duty of state institutions to accommodate sincerely held 
religious beliefs to the point of undue hardship.80  Whereas the 
majority ruled that the right to religious freedom must be 
balanced, on a case-by-case basis, against countervailing rights 
such as the accused’s right to a fair trial, the concurring and 
dissenting opinions reflected the range of perspectives on 
reasonable accommodation and religious freedom.   
In dissent, Justice Abella offered a contextual analysis 
that centered N.S.—evincing a specific understanding of N.S.’s 
social location and the context of sexual assault—and concluded 
that she must be permitted to wear her niqab while testifying.  
                                               
Canada disagreed, reasoning that the government interest in reducing 
identity theft and fraud outweighed the Hutterian Brethren’s religious 
freedom claim.  
77 Id. at para. 62. 
78 Id. at para. 104. 
79 R. v. N.S., 2012 SCC 72 (Can.). 
80 Id. at para. 51. 
No. 2:53]          QUEBEC’S BILL 62 71 
 
In contrast, the concurring opinion framed the niqab as a 
threat to core values, reflecting an uncritical notion of multi-
culturalism and a dogmatic interpretation of state secularism 
and religious neutrality.81  N.S. may weigh against the con-
stitutionality of Bill 62 because the law represents a blanket 
ban on face coverings irrespective of whether countervailing 
rights or public policy concerns—such as security, identifica-
tion, or communication—are at issue. 
Recent jurisprudence on state neutrality and secularism 
includes Loyola High School v. Quebec 82 and Mouvement laïque 
québécois v. Saguenay.83  In Loyola, the Supreme Court of 
Canada held that a state could not constitutionally require 
secular instruction in a religious school.84  In Saguenay, the 
court overturned the court of appeal’s finding that “absolute 
state neutrality is not possible from a constitutional point of 
view” because it is contrary to the state’s preservation of its 
history and tradition.85  It cited N.S. to reinforce that public 
space should be free from “coercion, pressure and judgment on 
the part of public authorities.”86  It also emphasized that “in 
addition to its role in promoting diversity and multiculturalism, 
the state’s duty of religious neutrality is based on a democratic 
imperative.”87 
 
III. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Analysis of Bill 62 requires a specific theoretical 
framework rooted in substantive legal analysis and critical race 
and post-colonial theory.  The following theoretical framework 
                                               
81 This should be understood in the political context of post-9/11 
Islamophobia.  
82 Loyola High School v. Quebec (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 12 
(Can.).  
83 Mouvement laïque québécois v. Saguenay (City), 2015 SCC 16 
(Can.).  
84 Loyola, 2015 SCC 12, at paras. 80–81.  Loyola High School, a 
Catholic school, argued that it should be exempt from a secular program 
that required secular, objective instruction on the basis that this requirement 
violated the school’s freedom of religion under section 2(a) of the Charter. 
85 Saguenay, 2015 SCC 16, at paras. 77–78.  In this case, an atheist 
man argued that prayer at the start of a municipal council’s public meeting 
violated his freedom of religion under section 2(a) of the Charter. 
86 Id.  
87 Id. at para. 75. 
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is useful in analyzing Bill 62; it contextualizes policies of 
reasonable accommodation as well as notions of secularism 
and state neutrality as they relate to racialized minorities. 
 
A. Interrogating Secularism and State 
Neutrality 
Secularism is a political philosophy that aims to create 
a secular state.88  It is a historically and geographically precise 
concept that should be understood as contingent and ideolog-
ical.  Neutrality, which is rarely included in legislation but is 
internationally a tenet of jurisprudence, is both ideological 
and procedural; whatever it means, it is “not a self-defining 
concept.”89  With respect to religion, state neutrality can mean 
both equal distance from religion and equal participation in 
religion.90  Despite their differences, secularism and neutrality 
are distinct but related concepts that are often used inter-
changeably.  Though there remains a longstanding question as 
to whether secularism is indeed neutral,91 the two concepts 
work together in jurisprudence and legal interpretation as a 
basis for the adjudication and accommodation of difference.  
Jointly, they have been used to resist reasonable accommo-
dation in religious equality claims and to “justify the regulation 
of minority women . . . as a universal model of women’s 
freedom.”92 
Canadian state neutrality was recently reaffirmed in 
Saguenay.  There, the Supreme Court of Canada held that a 
state’s duty of neutrality was breached when a Christian 
prayer was pronounced before council meetings, because it 
showed a preference for one religion to the detriment of others 
                                               
88 Rex Adhar, Is Secularism Neutral?, 26 RATIO JURIS 404, 405 
(2013); see also Richard Moon, Liberty, Neutrality, and Inclusion: Religious 
Freedom Under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 41 BRANDEIS 
L.J. 563, 563 (2003). 
89 Adhar, supra note 88, at 406. 
90 Id. at 412. 
91 Id. at 419. 
92 Choudhry, supra note 3, at 592; but see Susan Moller Okin, Is 
Multiculturalism Bad for Women?, BOS. REV. (Oct. 1, 1997), http://boston 
review.net/forum/susan-moller-okin-multiculturalism-bad-women/ [https://per 
ma.cc/UJA2-TFDN] (arguing that the multicultural group rights framework 
leaves minority women less protected from violence).  
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(or none).93  It found that the state’s duty of neutrality cannot 
be reconciled with a “benevolent neutrality” that does not 
require complete secularity.94  The court rejected “benevolent 
neutrality” and instead propounded “true neutrality,” which 
does not allow the state to adhere to a form of religious 
expression under the guise of historical reality or heritage and 
denies it the right to favor one religion over others.95  
Concepts of state secularism and neutrality have 
emerged as pivotal to the construction of national identity in 
the context of debates about reasonable accommodation—
particularly in Quebec.  Sujit Choudhry argues that the sen-
sitive socio-political context of intense debates regarding 
questions about religion in Quebec has led the Supreme Court 
of Canada to craft state neutrality as a way of mediating the 
tension between Quebec and the rest of Canada on issues of 
accommodation.96  Choudhry notes that Quebec judges tend to 
see a public interest in the neutrality of public or shared spaces, 
explaining that “to engage in religiously rooted conduct in these 
common portions could give rise to conflict, because it would 
alter the character of those spaces in a way that didn’t accord 
with the religious beliefs of others who had an equal legal right 
to those spaces.”97  According to this concept, state neutrality 
can function to privatize religion, thereby insulating both the 
state and its constituents from any religion-based conflict.98  
Any positive obligation on the part of the state is thus bound 
up in endorsing a particular religion and institutionalizing it 
in the public sphere, effectively creating the conditions for 
conflict that Quebec justices want to avoid.99  This view sits in 
tension with those articulated by supreme court judges from 
the rest of Canada for whom the positive obligation to ac-
commodate does not necessarily compromise state neutrality.  
The ambiguity and historical specificity of state neutrality thus 
serves as a flexible legal concept that can be used to justify 
                                               
93 Mouvement laïque québécois v. Saguenay (City), 2015 SCC 16, 
para. 150 (Can.). 
94 Id. at paras. 77–78. 
95 See R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 (Can.); S.L. 
v. Commission scolaire des Chênes, 2012 SCC 7, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 235 (Can.). 
96 Choudhry, supra note 3, at 580. 
97 Id. at 595. 
98 Id. at 599. 
99 Id. 
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competing visions of the state’s role in managing religious 
diversity. 
Many have used state neutrality to resist claims for 
reasonable accommodation.100  In Amselem, dissenting judges 
cited state neutrality as the basis for their refusal to incorpo-
rate the notion of reasonable accommodation into their anal-
ysis.101  Justice LeBel’s dissent in Congrégation des témoins de 
Jéhovah de St-Jérôme-Lafontaine v. Lafontaine focused on 
concerns for maintaining the state’s religious neutrality by 
refusing to accept any claim for state action to support religious 
practice.102  In Multani, the state neutrality principle arguably 
formed the basis of Justice Deschamps’s refusal to invoke the 
Charter to resolve an administrative law issue.103  State 
neutrality may also be seen as the premise of Justice 
Deschamps’s dissent in Bruker, in which the justice refused to 
engage in adjudicating a religious matter—the Jewish get.104  
Finally, in Hutterian Brethren, the Supreme Court of Canada 
relied on the notion of the neutral state to argue against the 
accommodation of religious practices.105 
At the same time, the concept of “religious cultural 
heritage” has emerged to justify the continued presence of 
Christian symbolism in the public sphere.  A recent controversy 
involving a Quebec City hospital illustrates this.  The hospital 
triggered public outrage amongst the majority Christian 
culture when it decided to remove a crucifix from its lobby.  
Beaman explains that “[r]ather than defend the crucifix 
drawing on its religious qualifications, the public debate and 
discussion focused almost entirely on culture, heritage, and 
the meaning of the neutrality of the state.  When religion was 
mentioned, it was linked to heritage and culture.”106  As a 
result of the general public’s response, the hospital returned 
                                               
100 Id. at 592. 
101 Id. at 594–96. 
102 See Congrégation des témoins de Jéhovah de St-Jérôme-Lafontaine 
v. Lafontaine (Village), 2004 SCC 48, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 650 (Can.); Choudhry, 
supra note 3, at 592. 
103 Choudhry, supra note 3, at 604–05.  
104 Id. at 600 (discussing Bruker v. Marcovitz, 2007 SCC 54, paras. 
102, 122–32 (Can.)).  
105 Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, 2009 SCC 37, 
para. 108 (Can.) (characterizing mandatory photograph requirement for 
licenses as a “neutral and rationally defensible policy choice”). 
106 Beaman, supra note 24, at 266. 
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the crucifix to its place only to affix alongside it a plaque his-
toricizing the role of the Church in the hospital’s founding.107  
This episode exemplifies how notions of culture and heritage 
are deployed today to render the majority religious faith 
universal in the public sphere.  The effect of this is to make 
minority religions’ claims to public space even more visible—
while “ours” is culture, part of our heritage and values, theirs 
is “religion,” particularistic and foreign.  In this way, hegemonic 
religion claims physical space in the guise of culture.108  
 
B. Foregrounding Structural Difference to 
Achieve Systemic Equality 
Multiculturalism in Canada is premised on an under-
standing of culture that homogenizes and essentializes 
groups.109  Canadian multiculturalism manages minority 
populations by slotting cultural communities into certain easily 
recognizable boundaries and rejecting diversity within groups 
to render them legible to the state.110  In failing to problematize 
culture, both state multiculturalism and the political theory 
on multiculturalism reinforce stereotypical views of racialized 
minority groups.111  This, in turn, homogenizes and essential-
izes minority groups by ignoring the diversity within them.112  
Minority groups are popularly understood to be profoundly 
different in their practices, beliefs, and values.  The dominant 
discourse tends to understand minority cultural and religious 
practices simplistically.  For example, the veil is often under-
stood as a symbol of oppression and victimization, signifying 
the wearer’s lack of agency rather than spiritual devotion or 
                                               
107 Id.  
108 Id. at 267; see also Lori G. Beaman, Between the Public and the 
Private: Governing Religious Expression, in RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE: 
CANADIAN CASE STUDIES 44, 54–55 (Solange Lefebvre & Lori G. Beaman eds., 
2014). 
109 ANNE PHILLIPS, MULTICULTURALISM WITHOUT CULTURE 162–63 
(2007). 
110 HIMANI BANNERJI, THE DARK SIDE OF THE NATION: ESSAYS ON 
MULTICULTURALISM, NATIONALISM, AND GENDER 6 (2000). 
111 Yasmeen Abu-Laban, The Politics of Recognition and 
Misrecognition and the Case of Muslim Canadians, in RECOGNITION VERSUS 
SELF-DETERMINATION: DILEMMAS OF EMANCIPATORY POLITICS 125 (Avigail 
Eisenberg et al. eds., 2014). 
112 PHILLIPS, supra note 109.  
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assertion of religious freedom.113  In turn, critics of multicul-
turalism claim that minority groups are inherently hostile to 
the values of the Canadian liberal democratic state, thereby 
posing a threat to political stability.114 
Canadian multiculturalism is thus mired in false bi-
naries: East versus West, modernity versus tradition, and 
culture versus equality.  Such an understanding of cultural 
difference does not only impact public policy; it also structures 
group identity, in response to the distribution of state 
patronage and benefits, through identity markers made salient 
by the state.115  As a result, questions of representation, agency, 
authenticity, and democratic participation gain urgency.  
Moreover, it raises concerns stemming from the paradox of 
multicultural vulnerability, whereby both state and community 
leaders exclude minorities within minorities from the articu-
lation of group interests and group identity.116  It is precisely 
at the intersection of multiple axes of discrimination—religion, 
gender, community, race, and class—that immigrant minority 
racialized women are located.  
Multiculturalism policy based on cultural difference is 
distinct from multiculturalism policy designed to respond to 
structural inequality.  Proper legal analysis of Bill 62 must be 
concerned with the latter.  Structural inequality is premised on 
what Iris Young calls a politics of structural difference.117  It 
is policy that focuses on issues of exclusion and inclusion, 
revising majority norms and standards that perpetuate sys-
temic inequality.  Structural difference is primarily concerned 
with inequalities that arise out of structural disadvantage—
when group subordination limits individual participation in 
social and political institutions.  In contrast, culturally-based 
inequalities arise when groups or individuals within groups 
                                               
113 Vrinda Narain, The Place of the Niqab in the Courtroom, 9 ICL J. 
41, 45 (2015). 
114 Azizah Y. al-Hibri, Is Western Patriarchal Feminism Good for 
Third World/Minority Women?, in IS MULTICULTURALISM BAD FOR WOMEN? 
41 (Joshua Cohen et al. eds., 1999); PHILLIPS, supra note 109, at 3–24. 
115 See Courtney Jung, Race, Class, and Ethnicity in the History of 
Mexican Indigenous Politics, in RECOGNITION VERSUS SELF-DETERMINATION: 
DILEMMAS OF EMANCIPATORY POLITICS 21 (Avigail Eisenberg et al. eds., 2014).  
116 See Abdullahi An-Na‘im, Promises We Should All Keep in 
Common Cause, in IS MULTICULTURALISM BAD FOR WOMEN? 59, 64 (Joshua 
Cohen et al. eds., 1999). 
117 Young, supra note 22, at 74, 79.  
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are denied the liberty to pursue distinct ways of life or when 
they bear significant economic or political costs in seeking to 
do so.118  
Of course, the politics of cultural difference predominate 
in the debate of political theorists.  This emphasis on cultural 
difference represents a shift away from issue-based politics to 
identity-based politics.  Though it is important to accommodate 
cultural difference by recognizing and affirming distinct cul-
tures and practices, it is critical to pay attention to structural 
injustice and systemic inequality in responding to minority 
claims.  For a multiculturalism policy to be effective, it must 
focus on exclusions that result from structural inequalities 
and not just on those that result from cultural difference.  
This exposes the structural dimensions of processes of exploita-
tion and normalization that keep groups in marginalized 
positions.  Structural problems are displaced onto issues of 
culture when policies based on cultural difference focus, as 
they invariably do, on what practices are or are not palatable 
to the state.  Issues of racism, poverty, unemployment, poor 
education, and access to justice are obscured in the process, 
while issues related to religion and culture are amplified.119  
This is not to say that the politics of cultural difference must 
be rejected.  Instead, as Nancy Fraser has argued, group dif-
ference that results both from cultural and from structural 
difference must be emphasized.120  To refocus attention on 
structural inequality, simplistic, oppositional understandings 
of women’s substantive equality and minority rights must be 
complicated.  
 
C. Theorizing Reasonable Accommodation 
Reasonable accommodation is the framework through 
which the state accommodates minority rights by balancing 
or reconciling competing rights, such as equality and religious 
freedom.  Informed by unequal power relations whereby a 
normative “we” is empowered to determine which aspects of 
“their” difference may be tolerated, reasonable accommodation 
measures minority practices against mainstream norms that, 
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though invisible, set the limits of accommodation.121  Religious 
difference, imagined as particularist and intolerant, is deemed 
a special exception while the normative majority’s culture, 
rational and tolerant, is normalized.122  As such, reasonable 
accommodation is “a tool of governmental intervention to 
manage diversity-related conflict,” a term that communicates 
the existence of problematic social behavior and renders state 
intervention necessary.123  Because reasonable accommodation 
focuses on the limits of toleration, it ignores any consideration 
of minority women’s rights and instead reinforces racial hi-
erarchies.  In the process, structural racism and systemic 
discrimination survive while state multiculturalism is 
strengthened and legitimized. 
Dominant understandings of multiculturalism define 
and shape the nature of reasonable accommodation, as do 
understandings of state secularism, religious neutrality, and 
gender equality implicated in this discourse.124  Legislative 
initiatives both in Quebec and in the rest of Canada (such as 
the BPA)125 make evident that there are shared understand-
ings of these concepts.  Such initiatives function discursively to 
affirm the nation’s core values, which are deeply intertwined 
with specific gender norms.126  As such, reasonable accom-
modation further reifies the imagined “feminism versus 
multiculturalism” and “secularism versus religion” dichotomies, 
which reinforce racialized governmentality and determine the 
limits of accommodation.127  
The discourse around reasonable accommodation 
normalizes race privilege and fails to adequately consider the 
power dynamics inherent in this paradigm.  Sirma Bilge has 
examined how the terms of Quebec’s reasonable accommoda-
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tion debate racialize immigrant women.  Bilge traces the ways 
in which public discourse uses culture as a mnemonic for race—
what she calls a “racializing code”128—to construct normative 
citizenship along racial lines.129  The language of “common 
values,” “ways of life,” and “shared heritage” function to in-
scribe racial difference while erasing race.130  Thus, whereas 
reasonable accommodation is commonly understood to be about 
religion and not race, it works in effect to exclude racialized 
Others from the national family while maintaining its legit-
imacy.131  Although race is embedded in the contested terrain 
of reasonable accommodation, the debate around reasonable 
accommodation has been “largely cast as raceless.”132  Whiteness 
as privilege is unnamed.133  
Himani Bannerji emphasizes questioning how the 
language of state multiculturalism obscures relations of power 
and reconceiving a popular or critical multiculturalism that 
reflects a “politicized understanding of cultural representa-
tion.”134  Embedded as it is in the governmentality of equity 
and diversity policies, reasonable accommodation tokenizes 
minority groups, as there is a lack of political will to really 
engage minorities or challenge institutionalized racism.  The 
language of reasonable accommodation also simplifies complex 
religious subjectivities by forcing individuals, deemed “re-
questers,” “to frame their religiosity as something that is well-
defined and ‘public.’”135  This, in turn, contributes to the hy-
pervisibility of religious difference.136  In this way, reasonable 
accommodation imposes stereotypical, essentialized under-
standings of minority cultures that “elude[] notions of 
equality.”137  
Debates over reasonable accommodation posit gender 
equality as irreconcilable with assertions of difference, such 
that a dialectical tension between difference and conformity 
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lies at the center of these debates.138  Often, the tension be-
tween women’s rights and multiculturalism is expressed as a 
sharp binary.  Their membership as equal citizens is seen as 
conflicting with their membership in a minority religious or 
cultural group, with the latter acting as a direct threat to the 
former.  Minority women are thus presented with an either/or 
choice between culture and rights, forced to trade access to 
education, employment, and political participation for cultural 
autonomy.139  In these contexts, women are seen and coded 
according to single-axis frameworks  which “‘distort the ex-
perience’ of racialized minority women” and erase race from 
the analysis by substituting “religion and culture.”140  By en-
tering state interests in its management of the putative 
“problem” of diversity, reasonable accommodation and state 
multiculturalism fail to redistribute social, economic, and 
political power to minority communities.  Such top-down 
practices of governmentality must be rejected in favor of in-
tersectional anti-racist theory and policy that looks to crafting 
remedies and institutional responses from the ground-up—
from the daily experiences of those at the intersections of 
multiple axes of discrimination—to create radical social justice 
tools that challenge racial injustice.141 
 
D. Combatting Persisting Colonial and 
Orientalist Tropes of Racialized Muslim 
Women 
As we have seen, reasonable accommodation constructs 
some citizens as ideal and casts out others.142  The discourse 
that names racialized Muslim women as “Other” is often 
Orientalist and derived from persisting colonial tropes, par-
ticularly when it focuses on the veil.  In Egypt, the British 
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distributed step-by-step guides on how to remove the veil.143  
The genealogy of laws controlling the veil is distinctly colonial 
and can be traced back to French colonialism in North Africa.  
In “Algeria Unveiled,” a landmark essay published in 1959, 
Frantz Fanon describes the veil as an object of colonial policy:  
 
We shall see that this veil, one of the elements 
of the traditional garb, was to become the bone 
of contention in a grandiose battle, on account 
of which the occupation forces were to mobilize 
their most powerful and most varied resources, 
and in the course of which the colonized were 
to display a surprising force of inertia. . . . The 
officials of the French administration in Algeria, 
committed to destroying the people’s originality, 
and under instructions to bring about the dis-
integration, at whatever cost, of forms of exist-
ence likely to evoke a national reality directly 
or indirectly, were to concentrate their efforts on 
the wearing of the veil, which was looked upon 
at this juncture as a symbol of the status of the 
Algerian woman.144 
 
Evoking the relationship between knowledge and power so well 
examined in Said’s work on Orientalism,  Fanon goes further: 
“Such a position is not the consequence of a chance intuition. 
It is on the basis of the analyses of sociologists and ethnolo-
gists that the specialists in so-called native affairs and the 
heads of the Arab Bureaus coordinated their work.”145  The 
work of these state-sponsored academics, who developed the 
cultural analyses and strategies of the colonial administration, 
had profound repercussions on the lives of Muslim colonial 
populations.  
Two justifications that dominate colonial literature 
against the veil are the narrative of rescue and the need for 
communication.  The familiarity of these justifications is 
striking; they have barely changed since the 1950’s.  Colonial 
policy depicted Algerian women as backwards and in need of 
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saving, with the veil standing in as a symbol of identity and 
culture and thus of oppression.146  Today, commentators and 
media sources continue to depict veiled women as subordinate 
and in need of rescue.147  This discourse animates the obsession 
with “choice”—the opposition of religious freedom and women’s 
equality—which in turn has stoked the fears of mainstream 
liberal feminists such as Susan Okin and Martha Nussbaum, 
who argue that “granting rights to protect minority or tradi-
tional cultural practices jeopardizes the struggle for gender 
equality because minority and traditional culture so often 
engage in domination of women.”148  Mainstream liberal 
feminists believe that minority women want to and must cast 
off their minority culture in order to realize their equal rights 
and join the ranks of “universal sisterhood.”149  Governmen-
tality regulated by particular understandings of gender nor-
mativity portrays Muslim women as unassimilable; they are 
constructed as threats to democratic values, to gender equality, 
and to the nation and its “legitimate” citizens.150  Paradoxically, 
Muslim women are simultaneously perceived as victims lacking 
agency and free choice and therefore in need of saving.151 
One of Bill 62’s purposes for the veil ban is the need for 
abolishing impediments to communication.152  According to this 
rationale, which mirrors the colonial logic of integration, the 
veil is an impediment to the integration of “Otherized” women 
into Canadian society as well as an undue burden on Canadian 
tolerance.  Questions related to communication often over-
emphasize the veil’s impact on actual communication and 
displace ideological stances onto the veil as a neutral physical 
object. 
The debates surrounding the veil and the niqab, as well 
as a number of other debates concerning reasonable accom-
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modation, rehash colonial and Orientalist tropes about Muslim 
women.  These tropes are barriers to rational deliberation and 
stand in the way of a politics of multiculturalism rooted in 
substantive equality. 
 
IV. BILL 62 
Justice Minister Stéphanie Vallée introduced Bill 62 in 
June 2015, and it was enacted into law on October 18, 2017.153  
From the outset, Bill 62 was the focus of controversy.  Although 
several organizations were in favor of the legislation, many 
opposed it on the grounds that the law unconstitutionally 
targeted Muslim women by the very terms of the law’s 
reference and application.  This section will review Bill 62 in 
detail and provide an analysis pursuant to the theoretical 
framework described in Part III. 
 
A. Purpose, Scope, and Provisions of Bill 62 
Chapter I of Bill 62 enunciates the Bill’s purpose.  The 
purpose of the law is to establish measures to foster adherence 
to state religious neutrality:  
 
This Act affirms the religious neutrality 
of the State . . . . To that end, the Act imposes a 
duty of religious neutrality, in particular on 
personnel members of public bodies in the exer-
cise of the functions of office. 
A further purpose of the Act is to recog-
nize the importance of having one’s face uncov-
ered when public services are provided and 
received so as to ensure quality communication 
between persons and allow their identity to be 
verified, and for security purposes. 
The Act also sets out criteria to be taken 
into consideration when dealing with requests for 
accommodations on religious grounds resulting 
from the application of the Charter of human 
rights and freedoms.154 
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Chapter II of Bill 62 (“Measures Fostering Adherence 
to State Religious Neutrality”) is organized into three divisions.  
Division I defines the scope of the Bill—the public bodies and 
state personnel affected.155  The scope is amplified by Division 
III, which allows public bodies to enforce the Bill contractually 
by importing its provisions into supplier contracts.156  Thus, 
Bill 62 includes personnel members of childcare centers, home 
daycare and any daycare centers subsidized by the government, 
and any private institution that may receive government 
resources.  
Strikingly, the Bill makes exceptions for public per-
sonnel whose purpose is providing spiritual care in health 
care, university, or correctional contexts.157  It also allows for 
religious instruction to be funded by the public as part of 
university-level educational institutions.158  These provisions 
respond to Loyola.159  Finally, Bill 62 claims that health pro-
fessionals “may refuse to recommend or provide professional 
services because of their personal convictions, as permitted 
by law.”160  
Chapter III (“Measures Within Various Bodies”) is also 
organized into three divisions. Division II (“Services with Faces 
Uncovered”) sets out the duty of uncovering one’s face:  
 
Personnel members of a body must exer-
cise their functions with their face uncovered. 
Similarly, persons who request a service 
from a personnel member of a body referred to 
in this chapter must have their face uncovered 
when the service is provided.161 
 
Division I gives the scope of Chapter III.  Combined 
with Division I of Chapter II, which gives the scope of the duty 
of religious neutrality, the Bill 62’s scope is very broad and 
includes within its ambit personnel members of all government 
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departments, government-funded bodies, and bodies whose 
personnel is appointed by government authorities.  Going 
further, it also applies to government agencies, school boards, 
general and vocational colleges and universities, municipalities, 
and public transit authorities.  Health services are also in-
cluded so that hospitals and clinics come within its scope.  
Finally, all bodies to which the National Assembly or any of 
its committees appoints the majority of the members are also 
subject to Bill 62.162  When the Bill refers to personnel members 
it also includes all personnel members of the National 
Assembly and the staff of the Lieutenant Governor’s office; all 
persons appointed or designated by the National Assembly to 
any office under its authority; persons appointed under the 
Public Service Act; any person appointed by the government 
or by a minister to exercise an adjudicative function within 
the administrative branch; all peace officers; and all physicians, 
dentists, and midwives who work in publicly funded health 
institutions.163  Notably, an amendment at the committee stage 
extended Bill 62’s reach to affect elected members of the 
National Assembly as well as elected municipal officers.164  
This list exhibits the immense scope of Bill 62 in affecting 
those who work in any institution funded or even partially 
funded by the provincial government—administrative bodies, 
service providers, health, and education.  
Division III (“Religious Accommodation”) of Chapter III 
lays out the framework for reasonable accommodation of the 
face-covering ban.165  The provision stipulates that a request 
for religious accommodation must be made pursuant to section 
10 of the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms.166  
Subsection 1 of section 11 provides that the request must be 
serious.  Per subsections 2 and 3, the accommodation requested 
must also be consistent with the right of equality between 
men and women and the accommodation requested must not 
compromise the principle of state neutrality.167  Finally, 
subsection 4 requires that the accommodation be “reasonable 
in that it does not impose undue hardship with regard to, 
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among other considerations, the rights of others, public health 
and safety, the proper operation of the body, and the costs 
involved.”168  
Strikingly, section 11 ends with the additional re-
quirement that “[a]n accommodation may be granted only if 
the person making the request has cooperated in seeking a 
solution that meets the criterion of reasonableness.”169  Sections 
13 and 14 also specify the factors that must be considered for 
a request for accommodation that involves an absence from 
work or a student attending a school-board-regulated educa-
tional institution. 
Lastly, Chapter IV (“Interpretative and Miscellaneous 
Provisions”) provides Bill 62’s most overwhelming caveat:  
 
The measures introduced in this Act must not 
be interpreted as affecting the emblematic and 
toponymic elements of Québec’s cultural heritage, 
in particular its religious cultural heritage, that 
testify to its history.170  
 
B. Analyzing Bill 62 
1. Interrogating Secularism and State 
Neutrality 
Bill 62 is an example of how state neutrality is used 
to limit rights.  As Sujit Choudhry argues, the idea of state 
neutrality has been used by the Supreme Court of Canada in 
an effort to mediate the tensions between Quebec and the 
rest of Canada and to reach a normative consensus with 
regard to reasonable accommodation.171  Indeed, Bill 62 aims 
to cast religion to the private sphere by barring the niqab in 
the use and provision of public services, thereby preserving 
Quebec’s divergent vision of state neutrality. 
Bill 62’s explanatory notes succinctly show some of 
the contradictions in the position of “state neutrality.”172  
These notes are premised on an incorrect understanding of 
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secularism and neutrality.  The Bill inexplicably links its 
insistence on religious neutrality to a prohibition on the 
manifestation of religious faith.  As per case law, religious 
neutrality is a debated notion whose meaning and application 
is not yet settled.173  Therefore, both parties in the ongoing 
constitutional challenge to Bill 62 are likely to marshal the 
concept to support their take as to the constitutionality of the 
law, with the government pointing to majority and minority 
opinions on neutrality in Lafontaine, Multani, and Hutterian 
Brethren and the plaintiffs pointing to opinions, exemplified 
in particular by Saguenay and N.S., that distinguish between 
state action and individual practice and reinforce the rela-
tionship between neutrality and Canadian multiculturalism.174 
The fact that the only manifestation of religious faith 
noted by the law is that of face coverings—which apply only 
to some female adherents of the Muslim faith—is discrimina-
tory and contradicts the Bill’s purpose of religious neutrality.  
Furthermore, the Bill codifies into law the concept of “religious 
cultural heritage,” a notion that, as noted above, carries con-
siderable popular discursive power as of late.  The provision, 
which references Quebec’s long history of Catholicism, shields 
majority cultural values, norms, and symbols, excluding these 
from Bill 62’s regulatory power as a matter of interpretation.  
Evidently, while Quebec’s (White) majority is understood to 
have “heritage,” distinct and apart from religion, minority 
groups are racialized by reference to their supposed religious 
excess.  
 
2. Foregrounding Structural Difference to 
Achieve Systemic Equality 
Bill 62 focuses on cultural difference to the detriment 
of an approach based on structural difference.  By fore-
grounding women’s rights in opposition to the wearing of the 
niqab, the Bill opposes women’s rights and cultural and reli-
gious identity.  It does not consider the effect of the Bill on 
Muslim women whose mobility, health, and educational op-
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portunities will be affected.  Instead, it focuses on the intol-
erability of a religious practice to the mainstream, on what it 
symbolizes for the majority, and on the importance of imposing 
consensus in an area that does not require unanimity.  
The plaintiffs who have filed a legal challenge to Bill 62 
have described the substantial impact of the Bill on their daily 
lives.  According to the pleadings,  
 
Since the passage of the Act, Ms. Ahmad's daily 
life has become significantly more difficult. She 
is concerned that the Act will impact her ability 
to continue going to university, visiting the 
library, going to the doctor, and taking public 
transportation. In fact, Ms. Ahmad now avoids 
taking public transportation for fear of being 
turned away or asked to remove her niqab, in-
stead relying on her father to drive her around. 
Ms. Ahmad has also experienced an increase 
in the number of Islamophobic and aggressive 
remarks she hears on the street. She has become 
uncomfortable being outside of her home alone, 
so she now often avoids leaving her house except 
to go to class.175 
 
The Bill is indifferent to the Muslim women it affects.  
It interferes substantially with niqabi women’s ability to access 
services and to participate in public life as equal citizens.  The 
barriers Bill 62 poses for Muslim women will further entrench 
poverty’s gendered nature.  Indeed, the Bill operates in direct 
contrast to Professor Maleiha Malik’s call for a “progressive 
multiculturalism” that seeks to include minority women in 
social, economic, and political life.176  
Finally, Bill 62’s drafters appear to have written it 
without consulting or including the voices of those groups 
whom it would most directly affect.  This lack of consultation 
underscores how legislative efforts that aim to manage reli-
gious diversity often neglect to consider the power relations 
or hierarchies inherent within them.  There is no critical in-
terrogation of who gets to decide what or who are the subjects 
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of regulation and the limits of toleration imposed by this 
framework.177  Instead, Bill 62 aims to placate popular anxie-
ties over the presence of Islam in Quebec and its purported 
effects on gender equality without engaging the women who 
are best positioned to speak to the nexus between their faith 
and their gender. 
 
3. Theorizing Reasonable Accommodation 
Reasonable accommodation is premised on a particular 
understanding of the national image.  It invokes a construction 
of the Other who seeks to be accommodated as somehow de-
viant.  The reasonable accommodation framework perpetuates 
a hierarchy of privilege that preserves the hegemonic power 
of the majority.178  As critiqued by scholars, reasonable ac-
commodation is dominated by unequal power relations in 
which a normative dominant group determines which aspects 
of difference may be accepted.  All minority claims are thereby 
measured against the yardstick of mainstream norms.  This 
yardstick is the epistemological tool that determines the vis-
ibility and invisibility of religion in the public sphere as well 
as the “quality of communication” that is hindered by face 
coverings.  Chapter I of Bill 62 states: 
 
This Act affirms the religious neutrality 
of the State . . . . To that end, the Act imposes a 
duty of religious neutrality, in particular on 
personnel members of public bodies in the exer-
cise of the functions of office. 
A further purpose of the Act is to 
recognize the importance of having one’s face 
uncovered when public services are provided and 
received so as to ensure quality communication.179  
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Indeed, Bill 62 privileges mainstream culture and 
religious traditions.180  Catholicism, the historically dominant 
religion in Quebec, is immune from Bill 62’s effects, allowing 
hegemonic religious norms to escape regulation or obvious 
sequestering to the private sphere.  The legislation targets 
Muslim niqabi women alone, whose faith comes in direct 
conflict with the Bill’s effects.  In doing so, Bill 62 effectively 
positions niqabi women outside of the public for whom state 
neutrality serves as a collective interest.  This is an example 
of the objectionable category of religious accommodation that 
fixes dominant and subaltern cultures by placing limits on 
other religious practices that are premised on whether the 
mainstream finds such practices tolerable.  At the same time, 
it relies on the myth of “national culture”—portrayed in Bill 62 
as Catholic and French—to assert dominance over “non-
national” cultures.181  By classifying Catholic symbols as part 
of “religious cultural heritage”182 and thus incapable of posing 
a threat to religious neutrality, it refuses to extend the 
generous title of “religious cultural heritage” to Muslim 
practices, which are understood as deeply religious, irrational, 
unreasonable, and fanatic.  The Other is stripped of religious 
symbols and manifestations, which are only permitted on some 
occasions and at the discretion of members of the majority 
community.  The majority community additionally decides if 
the Other is deserving of accommodation (and even then, only 
if they “cooperate”). 
 
4. Combatting Colonial and Orientalist 
Tropes of Racialized Muslim Women 
Certain provisions of Bill 62 reflect an Orientalist 
framing of minority rights and multiculturalism.  The Bill 
reaffirms Orientalist categories of analysis: us versus them, 
West versus East, secularism versus religion, modernity versus 
tradition, and gender equality versus the oppression of women.  
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This reinforces the cultural status quo, essentializing and 
othering members of racialized minority communities and 
reinforcing a Western moral and cultural superiority.  Bill 62 
does not further inclusion, equality, or democratic citizenship.  
On the contrary, it further stigmatizes and marginalizes 
Muslim women, who are portrayed as in need of saving and 
rescue from their own communities and from their own reli-
gious beliefs which are seen to impede “communication” and 
participation in the body politic.  
Bill 62 is an example of dog-whistle politics—the red 
herring of gender equality is raised once again, pandering to 
Orientalist and colonial stereotypes of the oppressed Muslim 
woman.  Similar to previous legislative initiatives such as Bill 
94 and Bill 60, Bill 62 prominently notes the principle of gender 
equality,183 and it identifies principles of secularism and state 
religious neutrality as its justification.  These principles are the 
ground on which mainstream liberal feminists have supported 
legislative regulation of Muslim and minority racialized 
women.184  Pursuant to subsections 2 and 3 of section 11, an 
accommodation request must be consistent with the right of 
equality between men and women and must not compromise 
the principle of state neutrality.185  In this way, Bill 62 and 
its predecessors animate and reinforce narratives of saving 
and rescue endemic to contemporary, neo-colonial debates on 
reasonable accommodation.  Furthermore, by positioning 
Catholic symbols as a part of Quebec’s history, Bill 62 plants 
a flag in symbolic culture, asserting the primacy and singular 
legitimacy of French Catholic culture in Quebec. 
 
C. The Future of Religious Discrimination in 
Canada  
The October 2018 elections, in which the Liberal Party 
was defeated by the Coalition Avenir Quebec (CAQ), indicate 
that the controversies surrounding Bill 62 remain at the 
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forefront of political debate.  Premier-elect Francois Legault 
announced that he would move quickly to propose a prohibition 
on people in public service wearing religious garb, such as 
kippahs, turbans, and hijabs.186  As a consequence of this 
proposed law, “public school teachers, crown prosecutors, po-
lice officers and judges would not be permitted to wear what 
the party calls religious signs.”187  Placing the blame for any 
adverse effects of this law on religious minorities themselves, 
CAQ representative Geneviève Guilbault “told reporters that 
public sector employees in the targeted professions will be the 
authors of their own demise if they choose to wear outwardly 
religious clothing or head coverings and will have to find other 
jobs.”188  Mindful that Bill 62 is currently subject to a consti-
tutional challenge, Legault has asserted a willingness to invoke 
the “notwithstanding clause” that permits the state to override 
fundamental rights.189  Under this new government, it appears 
religious minorities will not even be afforded the protections 
of the Charter, paving the way for increased regulation and 
marginalization.   
 
V. CONCLUSION 
The implications of Bill 62 become evident upon its 
analysis under a theoretical framework focused on interro-
gating secularism and state neutrality, foregrounding struc-
tural difference to achieve systemic equality, theorizing 
reasonable accommodation, and combatting persisting colonial 
and Orientalist tropes of racialized Muslim women.  According 
to this framework, Bill 62 uses state neutrality to limit 
minority rights, focuses on cultural difference rather than 
structural equality, reifies majority culture as the mainstream 
                                               
186 Jason Magder, CAQ Proposed Ban on Religious Garb Called 
‘Legalized Discrimination,’ MONTREAL GAZETTE (Oct. 3, 2018), https://montre 
algazette.com/news/local-news/caq-proposed-ban-on-religious-garb-called-
legalized-discrimination [https://perma.cc/6MZF-FFGU].  
187 Id.  
188 Id. 
189 The Canadian Press, Legault Prepared to Override Charter to 
Ban Religious Symbols, YOUTUBE (Oct. 3, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=E8Yw87FNSw0 [https://perma.cc/8YMP-ANCX].  Section 33 of the 
Canadian Charter, known as the notwithstanding clause, allows the gov-
ernment to pass a law in violation of the rights protected under sections 2 and 
7-15 of the Charter, subject to a five-year renewal.  
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norm, and rehashes colonial and Orientalist tropes of saving 
and rescuing Muslim women. 
Bill 62 codifies centuries-old stereotypes because it 
was enacted by a government stoking the fires of populism.  
Contrary to the drafters’ misguided attempts to foster a more 
inclusive society, the Bill will result in the exclusion of Muslim 
women.  It is, accordingly, anti-democratic.  More importantly, 
it likely violates the guarantees of religious freedom and gender 
equality under both the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and 
Freedoms and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.  
Bill 62 does not respond to a legal vacuum; it instead serves 
a political purpose, demonstrating a populist response to anti-
immigrant sentiment and widespread anxiety about the place 
of Muslim immigrants in Quebec. 
 
  
94 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF RACE AND LAW [Vol. 9:1 
 
 
